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Abstract 
Although much progress has been made in determining the cognitive profile of strengths and 
weaknesses that characterise individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), there 
remain a number of outstanding questions. These include how universal strengths and deficits 
are; whether cognitive subgroups exist; and how cognition is associated with core autistic 
behaviours, as well as associated psychopathology. Several methodological factors have 
contributed to these limitations in our knowledge, including: small sample sizes, a focus on 
single domains of cognition, and an absence of comprehensive behavioural phenotypic 
information. To attempt to overcome some of these limitations, we assessed a wide range of 
cognitive domains in a large sample (N=100) of 14 to 16 year old adolescents with ASDs 
who had been rigorously behaviourally characterised. In this review, we will use examples of 
some initial findings in the domains of perceptual processing, emotion processing and 
memory, both to outline different approaches we have taken to data analysis and to highlight 
the considerable challenges to better defining the cognitive phenotype(s) of ASDs. Enhanced 
knowledge of the cognitive phenotype may contribute to our understanding of the complex 
links between genes, brain and behaviour, as well as inform approaches to remediation. 
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Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) are more common than was previously 
recognised, affecting approximately 1 in 100 children and adolescents (Baird et al., 2006; 
CDC, 2009). It is well established that ASDs are highly heritable. However, the genetic 
mechanisms are complex and include rare chromosomal anomalies, several individual genes 
of major effect, and numerous common variants of small effect (Abrahams & Geschwind, 
2010). The term ASDs is now commonly used to describe a range of neurodevelopmental 
conditions that demonstrate considerable phenotypic heterogeneity, both in terms of 
presentation at any one age and across development (‘the autisms’; Geschwind & Levitt, 
2007), and which are likely to differ in underlying aetiology. However, they all share a 
primary impairment in social relatedness and reciprocity, alongside impairments in the use of 
language for communication and an ‘insistence on sameness’, which is in keeping with 
Kanner’s (1943) description of classically ‘autistic’ children. The presence of social and 
communication abnormalities, in combination with limited imagination and generativity, was 
characterised as the ‘triad of impairments’ by Wing and Gould (1979). The current 
classification systems include three domains of difficulties: reciprocal social interaction, 
abnormalities in communication, and patterns of non-functional restricted, repetitive and 
stereotyped behaviours (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000; ICD-10; WHO, 1993). However, the 
proposed revision for DSM-V combines the social and communication impairments into one 
domain, with the restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests, and activities forming 
the second domain (www.dsm5.org). These difficulties were once considered a particular 
characteristic of rare individuals, but are now more understood as a broad dimension of 
individual difference that is widely distributed in the general population
 
(Constantino & 
Todd, 2003).  
In addition to recognition of the heterogeneous aetiology and behavioural phenotype 
in ASDs, another challenge to perceiving autism as a unitary disorder has come from 
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‘fractionation’ of the autistic ‘triad’ of symptom domains, namely social impairments, 
communication impairments and rigid and repetitive behaviours (Happé, Ronald & Plonim, 
2006). Ronald and colleagues’ work on a large UK general population twin sample found that 
correlations between continuous measures of social, communication and repetitive behaviour 
were lower than expected. Further, whilst each aspect of the triad was highly heritable, the 
genetic influences on each of these domains of behaviour were largely non-overlapping 
(Ronald et al., 2005, 2006a,b). Happé and Ronald (2008) went on to review the evidence for 
‘fractionation’ at the behavioural and cognitive level in diagnosed cases and found broadly 
supportive evidence.  
Positioning the cognitive phenotype amongst genes, brains and behaviour 
There is increasing evidence that multiple aetiologies may converge to disrupt the 
development and function of several brain systems that are implicated in the social and non-
social behaviours that define ASDs (Happé & Ronald, 2008; Schroeder et al., 2010), 
including the frontal and temporal neocortex, the caudate, and the cerebellum (Abrahams & 
Geschwind, 2010). In addition, there is converging evidence from genetic studies and from 
brain imaging studies that decreases in functional connectivity between the frontal lobes and 
other brain systems may be characteristic of ASDs, leading to the suggestion that ASDs are 
‘developmental disconnection syndromes’ (Frith. 2004; Geschwind & Levitt, 2007; Minshew 
& Williams, 2007). There is also intriguing evidence that there might be an abnormal brain 
growth trajectory in the first year of life in individuals with ASDs, which might account for 
the abnormal connectivity seen later (Carper & Courchesne, 2005). These perturbations 
precede the behavioural regression or setback that is seen in between one quarter and one 
third of cases. However, the processes underlying regression are unknown and no association 
has been found between head circumference trajectory and a history of regression (Webb et 
al., 2007).  
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Understanding the cognitive phenotype of ASDs may play a critical role in 
establishing the links between genes, brain development and behaviour, which will have far-
reaching implications for science and practice. Increasing amounts are known from clinical 
and non-clinical populations about the brain systems that subserve particular cognitive 
functions. This means that when a cognitive profile is identified – with some cognitive 
abilities being impaired, others being spared/intact and still others being enhanced – this can 
act as a signpost pointing ‘back’ to the structure and function of the particular brain systems 
and circuits that are involved in these processes, and back further still to the genetic and 
epigenetic influences on these neural systems. In a different way the cognitive phenotype 
signposts ‘forward’ to behaviour on the assumption that cognition is one of the ‘drivers’ of 
behaviour. Sometimes cognition might be characterised not merely by intact/ impaired/ 
enhanced processing but by the recruitment of alternative or compensatory mechanisms to 
solve problems, which will become more pronounced as development proceeds.  
Investigating the cognitive phenotype of ASDs may also provide insights into the 
‘autistic experience’. There has been a growing interest amongst cognitive psychologists in 
directly investigating how people with autism process (and therefore experience) the world 
around them. This interest has been enhanced by new technologies, such as eye tracking, 
which gave an insight in the ‘world view’ of individuals with autism outside of a set task or 
experiment (see the Yale ‘Virginia Woolf Study’ for one of the first, and perhaps most 
striking, examples; Klin et al., 2002). Another influence has been the experiential accounts of 
higher functioning individuals with ASDs, who have described their own unusual (and often 
aversive) sensory experiences and their self-developed strategies to minimise or  manage 
these (Grandin, 2009; Williams, 1992). These experiences have not been easily accounted for 
by the dominant cognitive models that emerged in the 1980s. Put crudely, the ‘theory of mind 
account’ (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) of ASDs was primarily motivated by consideration of 
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which cognitive difficulties could explain social communication impairments, and the 
‘executive dysfunction account’ (Ozonoff et al., 1991) was primarily motivated to explain 
lack of generativity, and repetitive and stereotyped behaviours. Partly in response to such 
personal accounts, and with the growing realisation that neither theory of mind nor executive 
dysfunction would provide a ‘unitary account’ of the autism behavioural phenotype, 
alternative cognitive theories emerged. These included Frith and Happé’s weak central 
coherence account (Frith, 1989; Happé & Frith, 2006), Mottron’s ‘enhanced perceptual 
functioning’ account (Mottron et al., 2006), Plaisted’s (2001) theory of reduced 
generalisation and enhanced discrimination ability, and Baron-Cohen’s notion of ‘hyper-
systemising’ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2005). The weak central coherence account has specifically 
limited its explanatory scope to non-social assets and deficits seen in ASDs (Happé & Frith, 
2006). Mottron’s and Plaisted’s accounts have been less clear in stating their explanatory 
scope, and the in/dependence of systemizing and empathizing is still somewhat uncertain (see 
Happé & Ronald, 2008), but in keeping with growing awareness of the heterogeneity of 
ASD, the zeitgeist has moved on from unitary accounts that attempt to account for all of the 
behavioural phenotype of ASDs to focus on explaining particular behavioural phenomena. 
Searching for subtypes on the autism spectrum 
The realisation that the clinical syndrome of autism is heterogeneous in aetiology and 
presentation presents significant challenges to a number of scientific enterprises. The search 
for genes or brain abnormalities might be more efficient if ‘true’ subgroups within ASD 
could be identified for study, rather than the heterogeneous whole. One approach to 
subgrouping is to study biological syndromes of known aetiology that are frequently 
associated with ASD, such as fragile-X syndrome (Belmonte & Bourgeron, 2006) or tuberous 
sclerosis (de Vries, 2010). However, it might not be the case that biological subtypes will be 
associated with ‘neat’ cognitive or behavioural phenotypes; even in biologically based 
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syndromes where ASDs show raised prevalence  there exists considerable behavioural and 
cognitive (e.g., IQ) heterogeneity (Chonchaiya, Schneider & Hagerman, 2009; Pratha & de 
Vries, 2004). 
Conversely, there is some (though as yet, fairly weak) evidence that constraining the 
behavioural phenotype to a narrower subgroup within ASD might help identify the genetic 
underpinnings. Some studies have found increased linkage when studying samples 
characterised or subgrouped on the basis of social responsiveness (Duvall et al., 2007), 
language delay (Alarcon et al., 2002) or ‘insistence on sameness’ (Shao et al., 2003). There is 
currently a considerable industry dedicated to determining behavioural subtypes that might 
provide insights or even breakthroughs into understanding the aetiology of ASDs (e.g. 
Ingram et al., 2008; Munson et al., 2008). To date, however, few distinct behavioural 
subtypes have been identified and none is yet well-replicated. 
The existence of cognitive subgroups might have considerable practical implications 
for intervention. Identifying subgroups of individuals with ASD who have atypicalities in a 
particular cognitive domain would give scope for carefully targeted interventions, focused on 
improving areas of weakness through practice or providing alternative/ augmentative 
pathways to task performance and learning. Further, if cognitive strengths exist in an 
identifiable  subgroup of individuals with ASDs, then not only could positive outcomes be 
gained by developing and nurturing areas of ability but it might be possible to utilise these 
‘talents’ to overcome areas of weakness. For example, Scheuffgen, Happé, Anderson and 
Frith (2000) showed that inspection time (a marker of processing speed and efficiency) was 
far better in ASD than would be expected from measured IQ (e.g. on Wechsler scales), and 
suggested that non-social routes to learning might maximise this potential. Conversely, in our 
study of a large population-based sample of young people with ASD, we found high rates of 
specific underachievement in numeracy and/or literacy, given general intellectual ability 
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(Jones et al., 2009a). Each of these studies illustrate the value of cognitive  research for 
guiding education and intervention, and suggest that interventions targeted at specific areas of 
difficulty would be an efficient way of bringing about positive change for individuals with 
ASD.  
Another informative psychological approach is to link cognition to behaviour. 
Although this does not demonstrate that the cognition is driving the behaviour, it is consistent 
with the view that cognition and behaviour might be associated with (and, during the course 
of development, influence) each other. However, another possibility is that other aetiological 
factors are shared in common that affect the development both of behaviour and of cognition. 
Demonstrating specific cognition-behaviour associations might inform approaches to 
intervention, and intervention studies, in turn, can help move beyond association to establish 
likely causality. For example, the identification of cognitive impairments that are most 
closely associated with behaviours that parents and carers find very problematic (e.g. sensory 
abnormalities, anxiety) could open the route for the development of novel cognitive training 
approaches to treatment, which to date have largely been overlooked. Cognition-behaviour 
associations have already been identified in ASDs. Joseph and Tager-Flusberg (2004) found 
that both theory of mind and executive function abilities were associated with communication 
(but not social or repetitive) symptoms, even once language abilities had been accounted for. 
We found that self-reported auditory sensory experiences were associated with auditory 
discrimination abilities in a computerised task where participants had to successfully 
discriminate the frequency, intensity and duration differences in pairs of sounds (Jones et al., 
2009b). However, these associations have not been as easy to demonstrate as was once hoped 
(for negative examples see Pellicano et al., 2006; Ozonoff et al., 2004). In one of the largest 
studies of its kind, Ozonoff et al. (2004) examined the extent to which planning and set 
shifting (as measured by the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery; 
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CANTAB) was associated with behaviour in a sample of 79 individuals with autism. They 
found no associations between performance on the executive tasks and autism symptoms as 
measured by the ADI-R and ADOS-G, but did find that performance on the planning task 
was (negatively) associated with adaptive behaviour. Whether this difficulty in making 
cognition-behaviour links reflects methodological limitations of the studies conducted to 
date, or indicates that straightforward associations across explanatory levels may not be 
found, remains to be determined.  
General cognitive abilities in ASDs 
The long-established view of intellectual abilities in ASDs was that up to 75% of individuals 
had an intellectual disability (previously referred to as ‘mental retardation’), defined by an 
IQ<70, alongside accompanying impairment in everyday functioning. Since the original 
description by Lockyer and Rutter (1970), it has been a widespread clinical view that 
Performance IQ (PIQ) is typically higher than Verbal IQ (VIQ).  In addition there is evidence 
at a subtest level (e.g., on Wechsler intelligence tests) of a characteristic profile of strengths 
(or ‘peaks’) on subtests such as Block Design and weaknesses (or ‘troughs’) on subtests such 
as Comprehension (Happé, 1995; Mayes & Calhoun, 2003). However, many of these widely 
held views about the intelligence of children with ASDs were first formed several decades 
ago when conceptualisation of autism was very different from today. It may be the case that 
historical data do not apply to children who currently receive an ASD diagnosis (Charman et 
al., 2009; Fombonne, 2009). Particularly, the evolving diagnostic criteria for ASDs have 
widened to include a more heterogeneous population of individuals, especially those at the 
more able end of the intellectual spectrum.    
Reflecting this, recent epidemiological studies, including our own on the sample 
reported in this paper, have found that only approximately half of children with an ASD have 
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intellectual disability (Bertrand et al., 2001; Chakrabarti & Fombonne, 2005; Charman et al., 
in press). Further, we found only weak support for a distinctive PIQ-VIQ profile: at a group 
mean level PIQ was higher than VIQ (but only by a few points) and when examined at the 
level of clinically meaningful PIQ-VIQ discrepancies the most common profile was for PIQ 
to be similar to VIQ (Charman et al., in press). There was some support for a distinctive 
profile at the WISC subtest level but it was only partly consistent with the previous literature. 
In line with other studies, we found that performance on the Vocabulary and Comprehension 
subtests was poor compared to other abilities. However, neither Block Design nor Object 
Assembly was a significant strength as has been reported previously (Happé, 1995; Lincoln et 
al., 1995; Mayes & Calhoun, 2003; Caron et al., 2006). Instead, Picture Completion and 
Picture Arrangement, which both heavily rely on visual materials, were areas of strength 
(‘peaks’) in the total ASD sample and in the subgroup with IQ>70. In addition, we found no 
support for the idea that individuals with a non-verbal advantage have higher levels of social 
impairment, casting doubt on this as a putative meaningful subgroup (Tager-Flusberg & 
Joseph, 2003). In sum, ASDs can be found in individuals with both a low and high IQ, is 
associated with an uneven profile of cognitive abilities, and can also be associated with 
delayed language development.  Any explanatory account of the ‘cognitive phenotype’ needs 
to be minded of these varying characteristics.   
Limitations of the extant literature and rationale for the SNAP cognitive phenotype study 
Although some aspects of the cognitive phenotype of ASD have been well characterised, the 
approach taken to identifying the profile of strengths and impairments has been somewhat 
piecemeal. Few studies have included children across the breadth of the autism spectrum (in 
terms both of IQ and symptom severity) and most have employed small samples, which 
limits the ability to identify subtypes. Studies have tended to measure abilities in one 
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cognitive domain (or at most two domains; see Pellicano, 2010, in press, for a rare exception) 
only and few have comprehensively behaviourally characterised their participants.  
In response to this we have conducted a study that examined a wide range of 
cognitive processes in a large and well characterised sample of adolescents with ASDs. One 
motivation was to provide a profile of cognitive strengths and weaknesses across a wide 
variety of cognitive domains; another was to examine the pattern of associations between 
cognition and behaviour (both autistic behaviours and common comorbidities). We also 
wanted to use the dataset to examine whether any true cognitive subtypes existed. The 
present paper will summarise published findings from initial analysis of this complex dataset 
and will illustrate the challenges to characterising the cognitive phenotype of ASDs outlined 
above. 
We took advantage of a large, well-characterised cohort of children with ASDs who 
had been assessed as part of a prevalence study of autism in the UK: The Special Needs and 
Autism Project (SNAP; Baird et al., 2006). As part of the SNAP study over 150 10-to-14-
year-olds met consensus (GB, ES, TC) clinical ICD-10 diagnoses for childhood autism or 
‘other ASDs’ using information from the Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised (ADI-R; 
Lord, Rutter & Le Couteur, 1994) and Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS-G; 
Lord, Risi, Lambrecht, et al., 2000) as well as IQ, language, psychopathology and adaptive 
behaviour measures (see Baird et al., 2006; for details). Parents had also completed a pack of 
questionnaires measuring other common comorbidities: repetitive behaviour, sensory 
behaviour, pragmatics and executive dysfunction.  
For the SNAP cognitive phenotype study, 100 of the adolescents with an ASD (54 
childhood autism; 46 other ASD) were seen several years later to complete a broad battery of 
cognitive tasks and additional parent- and self-report (N~60) behavioural questionnaires. The 
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cognitive tasks included both standardised and experimental measures (described below). 
Controls comprised some of the non-ASD children (N=26) who were seen as part of the 
SNAP study and typically developing children from mainstream schools (N=31). Both 
groups were seen at a mean age of 15 years 6 months (SD=6 months, range 14;2 to 16;11). 
IQ was assessed using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI
UK
; Wechsler, 
1999). The mean Full Scale IQ of both groups fell within the average-to-low average range 
(ASD = 84.2 (19.0); non-ASD = 88.0 (22.2)) although a wide range of IQ was included (50 to 
133). There was no significant difference in intellectual ability between the two groups.  
Measures 
Across two testing sessions lasting approximately 3 to 3-and-a-half hours each (excluding 
breaks), the participants completed a total 58 tasks (see Figure 1). They completed one of two 
fixed orders of tasks with verbal, pen-and-paper and computerised tasks being intermingled 
to maintain concentration and attention. Whilst most participants completed the majority of 
the task battery some data were missing on some tasks due to task difficulty, non-
cooperation, equipment failure or time limitations. This review will principally refer to three 
sets of analysis that form part of the initial output from the study. The first investigated 
auditory perceptual processing (Jones et al., 2009b), the second took a structural equation 
modelling approach to emotion recognition ability (Jones et al., in press a) and the final was 
an investigation of ‘everyday memory’ abilities (Jones et al., in press b).  
Challenges to establishing the cognitive phenotype(s) of ASDs 
We will outline some of the challenges to establishing the cognitive phenotype and report our 
experiences of attempting to address these issues from the SNAP cognitive phenotype study. 
a. Heterogeneity  
 13 
Heterogeneity seems to exist at all levels in ASDs: biological, cognitive and 
behavioural. One strategy that follows from the suggestion that the triad of behavioural 
impairments is ‘fractionable’ (Happe & Ronald, 2008) would be to examine how specific 
cognitive abilities map onto specific behavioural features of ASDs, rather than simply 
discriminating between ASD cases and controls (see Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004). In the 
same way that the distinct constellation of social, communication and rigid/repetitive 
behaviours are immediately apparent when they present in a clinical setting (i.e. a 
behavioural phenotype that ‘hangs together’), there may be cognitive characteristics that are 
found in all or most children with an ASD, even those with different aetiologies or 
presentations.  
Most of the experimental work on cognition in autism adopts the between-group 
experimental paradigm, where task performance is compared between a group of individuals 
with an ASD and a control or comparison group. However, the reporting of these findings (in 
terms of the group with ASDs being ‘impaired’ or ‘advanced’, depending on the direction of 
group differences) de-emphasises variability within the group with ASDs, and the overlap in 
scores between the groups. Furthermore, there is often greater heterogeneity in the ASD 
group than in the comparison group (SDs tend to be larger). To give one example from our 
own dataset, on the Ekman facial emotional recognition task, where the total possible score is 
between zero and 60 (chance performance would be 10), 8-out-of-10 of the lowest scoring 
(<28) and 8-out-of-10 of the highest scoring (>53) adolescents were from the ASD group 
(see Jones et al., in press a; data not published). In the past few years, investigators have been 
tackling this issue head on and identifying subgroups with impaired/intact performance and 
demonstrating the spread of scores of the ASD and the control group, paying attention to 
overlap and to outliers, as well as to mean group differences (see Milne et al., 2006; 
Pellicano, in press; White et al., 2009; for some of the best examples of this approach). The 
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fact that there is nearly always overlap in performance between the ASD group and the 
comparison group serves as a reminder that we are investigating the degree to which 
cognitive systems are differently ‘set’ or ‘tuned’ compared to typically developing 
individuals and not the absolute presence or absence of an all-or-none cognitive 
function/ability. Alternatively, tasks might be  tapping into an end point of development, with 
compensation and other factors causing variation in outcome on tests even when an initial 
impairment has been shared by all members of the group. 
b. Sample size and subtypes 
Another significant challenge has been an acceptance in the field of small sample sizes.  This 
was traditionally the only practical route to study autism, given the rarity of the diagnosis in 
the 70’s or 80’s. In addition, most researchers are interested in findings of large effect size, 
given the dramatic nature of the difference between ASD and TD in so many domains. 
However, multiple studies reporting on small samples increase the chance of spurious 
findings entering the literature. It can be hard to be confident that a hypothesis of group 
difference in cognitive domain X has been disproved. Fortunately, this has begun to change 
in the past few years and, increasingly, researchers are recruiting larger samples. This is 
particularly the case if one positively wants to study both lower and higher IQ individuals. 
Finally, if one of the primary aims of a study is to test whether subgroups or subtypes of 
ASDs exist (that might or might not be associated with particular behavioural or biological 
subtype) then large sample sizes are required.  
This is demonstrated by our experience of studying auditory discrimination in our 
adolescent sample (see Jones et al., 2009b). Whilst at a group level auditory discrimination 
abilities (frequency, intensity, duration) were not different in individuals with ASD compared 
to controls, enhanced frequency discrimination was present in around 1 in 5 individuals with 
ASD in the frequency domain. Because 16 adolescents with an ASD failed to pass a hearing 
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screen they were excluded from the study (or at least their data was not analysed) leaving a 
sample size in the ASD of only 72. From this the enhanced frequency subgroup was ~20% or 
14 children. In this study we used the threshold of >1.65 SD above the control group to 
define ‘enhanced’ performance but the pattern was invariant when a more stringent threshold 
of >2 SD was used, suggesting that a systematic association existed between enhanced 
frequency detection and membership of the ASD, as opposed to the control, group. This is a 
large enough putative subgroup that we have some confidence that the developmental profile 
we identified of average or above average IQ but a history of delayed language milestones 
might be reliable and have some meaning (see Table 4, Jones et al., 2009b). There was also 
an a priori motivation to examine this developmental profile as it has been suggested that that 
an over-focus on perceptual cues, particularly pitch, during speech negatively impacts upon 
linguistic processing (Järvinen-Pasley et al., 2008b). It remains to be determined whether the 
frequency sensitivity of our subgroup interfered with their language development or whether 
this was due to other factors.  Our finding has since been replicated using a similar paradigm 
by Bonnel and colleagues (Bonnel et al., 2010), providing independent evidence of a putative 
cognitive and behavioural subtype.  
A typically sized study of 25 participants would have resulted in just 5 such 
individuals being identified and the likely confidence in any associated behavioural profile 
would have been considerably reduced. The traditional model of science in the cognitive field 
has been an investigator-led lab devising novel experimental tasks or adaptations to existing 
experimental tasks and publishing modest size studies independently. In future, there will be 
the need for significant collaborative effort (and funders will have to acknowledge this and 
support such collaborations) in the cognitive field in the same way that there has been in the 
behavioural and genetic fields, as exemplified by the AGRE (www.agre.org) and Simons 
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Simplex (www.sfari.org) collaborations, to achieve the samples required to identify putative 
cognitive subtypes of the ASDs. 
c. Modelling approaches to analysis 
Accumulating thousands of variables from the (close to) 58 tasks completed by the 100 
adolescents with an ASD made us aware of the need for a parsimonious approach to data 
analysis. One example where there was good synergy between statistical parsimony and 
theoretical rigour was on a set of 3 tasks that the participants completed looking at basic-level 
emotion recognition abilities. Evidence suggests that emotion recognition in different 
domains is underpinned by a multimodal emotion processing ability (e.g. Scott et al., 1997). 
However, current research into emotion recognition ability in ASD investigates visual or 
vocal emotion recognition ability discretely. We tested both visual (facial) and auditory 
(verbal and non-verbal vocalisations) basic emotion recognition in adolescents with ASD 
compared to age and IQ matched controls, including both high and low IQ participants (see 
Jones et al., in press a). A structural equation modelling (SEM) approach allowed us to model 
‘emotion recognition ability’ for each emotion as a composite ‘latent’ trait, measured by the 
three tasks. This approach enables us to encapsulate emotion recognition ability as a 
multimodal construct, which we argue better illustrates competence in recognising emotion 
than focusing on one modality. Using this approach we found no evidence of a fundamental 
impairment in emotion recognition ability in adolescents with ASD, although emotion 
recognition ability was strongly associated with IQ across both ASD and non-ASD groups 
(Jones et al., in press a).  
 The sample completing these tasks in our study (N=99 ASD participants), although 
large by the standards of traditional psychological analyses, was at the lower limits of 
feasibility and power for modelling. In the behavioural field, complex modelling approaches 
are used with ASD sample sizes in the hundreds (Munson et al., 2008) and thousands (Frazier 
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et al., 2010; Ingram et al., 2008). Any single experimental paradigm measures one aspect of 
cognitive processing only and multiple experimental measures will measure different 
elements of an underlying ‘latent’ cognitive construct. This makes the adoption of SEM and 
other modelling approaches, such as latent class analysis (LCA), a parsimonious and 
attractive approach to analysis of cognitive data. Pooling of datasets will be required to 
undertake such analyses. With the increasing computerisation of many experimental 
paradigms, which can help (but not entirely eliminate) concerns about uniform 
administration, such collaborations should be possible. 
d. Development 
Given that ASDs are emergent developmental disorders, one clear limitation of our study is 
that we studied a sample at one age only. The rationale for this, in part, was that by this age 
adolescents with ASDs would be able to withstand a lengthy testing battery; though in truth it 
seemed expedient to study a sample on whom we had already acquired in-depth behavioural 
phenotyping (SNAP study). Studying individuals who may have reached developmental 
maturity in a cognitive domain can make interpretation of results difficult when performance 
on a task is unimpaired. For example, the Jones et al. (in press a) emotion recognition study 
failed to find group differences but we cannot discount that differences might have been 
apparent had we tested participants at an earlier age. On the Ekman facial emotion 
recognition task, both the ASD and the non-ASD high IQ subgroups (IQ>=80) performed at 
approximately the same level as typically developing 15-17 years olds (Campbell et al., 
2006), so even if they had previously had difficulties with such stimuli they had achieved the 
normative level of competence by adolescence. 
Clearly, developmental approaches to establishing the cognitive phenotype of ASDs 
are required given that ASDs are developmental disorders, notwithstanding the practical (and 
funding) difficulties of conducting such studies. The few longitudinal cognitive studies that 
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have been conducted have provided important information about the associations, and 
possible developmental relations, between different domains of cognition over time. For 
example, Pellicano (2010) found that executive function and central coherence skills were 
longitudinally predictive of change in children's theory of mind test performance, 
independent of age, language, nonverbal intelligence, and early mentalising skills, but that 
predictive relations in the opposite direction were not significant (see also Munson et al., 
2008). One emerging methodology that promises much in this regard is the prospective study 
of genetically at-risk younger siblings of a brother or sister with an ASD diagnosis. Several 
groups are using experimental behavioural and neuroimaging measures of cognitive 
processes in such studies, which by their nature are longitudinal in design (see Yirmiya & 
Charman, 2010; for a review). 
e. IQ 
In our study we included adolescents across a very wide range of IQ from 50 to 130, 
excluding only the lowest functioning adolescents who would have found the experiments 
and the testing session inaccessible. There has been a vogue amongst many cognitive 
psychologists for studying only ‘higher functioning’ individuals, by which people mean 
individuals with average or above average IQ. This is presented as avoiding the 
‘contamination’ of lowered intellectual ability, allowing a more informative study of the 
autism itself and not comorbidities, which are more common in individuals (both ASD and 
non-ASD) with lower IQ. Certainly, in our study IQ was strongly related to performance on 
most of the cognitive endophenotype measures (we have yet to find one to which it does not 
relate but it will be of potential interest when we do).  
However, it is also the case that not all important associations are carried by IQ. In 
our study of everyday memory, IQ was equally strongly associated with performance on the 
everyday memory task and the verbal (list) recall task (r=.53 and r=.48, respectively) but only 
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prospective remembering in a proxy ‘everyday memory’ context (but not verbal recall) was 
associated with autism symptom severity as measured by the ADOS (independently of IQ), 
with poorer social and communicative abilities relating to diminished capacity for 
prospective remembering (Jones et al, in press b). We interpreted this as evidence of the 
impact of poor social and communication skills in ASD on everyday memory competence; 
although it cannot be discounted that developmental difficulties with everyday memory may 
impact upon the development of social and communication abilities. The fact that adolescents 
with ASD were poorer than controls on the everyday memory task and that these abilities 
were associated with social and communication impairments, should motivate further 
investigation of such memory abilities, which have largely been overlooked due to a focus on 
formal standard memory measures. 
More generally, the view that it is preferable for cognitive psychologists to only study 
individuals of at least average intelligence contains several assumptions that need to be 
challenged (or at the very least tested). First, in ASDs comorbidity is the norm and not the 
exception. Approximately 50% of individuals with an ASD also have an intellectual 
disability (IQ<70; Charman et al., in press) and approximately 70% meet criteria for a child 
psychiatric disorder (Simonoff et al., 2008). Second, determining whether the profile of 
cognitive abilities differs in low vs. higher IQ individuals with an ASD is potentially highly 
informative and is something we plan to test in our dataset. To our knowledge there is no 
evidence, as yet, for a specific or different cognitive phenotype in high vs. low IQ individuals 
with ASDs and this remains a testable empirical question. 
f. Hypothesis-testing experimental designs vs. broad characterisation of cognitive profiles 
It is pertinent to remind ourselves of how much we have learnt from the last 5 decades of 
hypothesis-driven experimental study of individuals with ASD, initiated by the seminal work 
of Hermelin and O’Connor in the 1960s (O’Connor & Hermelin, 1967). The potential 
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downside to our approach of covering a wider range of cognitive domains in the same sample 
is the risk of less informative and potentially spurious differences emerging. When such a 
wide range of cognitive processes are studied it is not possible to include every possible 
control condition or manipulation, which is the strength of more focused experimental 
studies. These can be helpful in determining precisely which aspects of a particular 
experiment paradigm participants had difficulties with.  Another limitation is the time that 
data collection on large samples on a wide range of measures takes, limiting the ability to 
reflexively respond to emerging findings.  
Meyer-Lindenberg (2010) gives a useful reminder that ‘not all intermediate 
phenotypes are created equal’ – some will be more strongly associated with the genotype than 
others but at the outset one does not know which these are. One has more confidence to 
invest time and effort in studying phenotypes for which there are strong associations and  
plausible mechanisms. Therefore, just as in the genetic field where there needs to be a mixed 
economy of atheoretical designs such as large genome wide association studies (GWAS) and 
empirically-driven approaches such as candidate gene studies, efforts to establish the 
cognitive phenotype(s) of ASDs requires both focused, hypothesis-driven approaches and 
large, exploratory studies.  
Concluding comments 
The findings presented here from some initial analyses of this large and complex dataset, 
generated by 100 adolescents with an ASD completing all or most of 58 standard and 
experimental cognitive tasks, are clearly only preliminary. Currently we are using a number 
of statistical approaches, including exploratory and confirmatory factor analytic techniques, 
latent class analysis and structural equation modelling to adopt parsimonious approaches to 
reducing the data, identifying subgroups and examining the associations between cognition 
and behaviour.  
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Why is establishing the cognitive phenotype of ASDs important? The contributions 
discussed above of, (i) targeting remediation and (ii) providing a window into the ‘autistic 
experience’, stand for themselves. However, given the limitations of the heterogeneous 
behavioural phenotype, both to establishing a diagnosis and to the design and conduct of 
scientific studies in fields such as neuroimaging and genetics, should we consider using 
cognitive phenotypes to aid clinical practice and science? We are clearly some way from 
establishing what a diagnostically useful cognitive phenotype (or profile) looks like. 
However, diagnostic evaluation currently relies on behavioural and developmental 
information and, in future, could be usefully enhanced by information on cognition (beyond 
general ability, which is already utilised). Indeed, there are particular benefits to using 
cognitive assessments, which are likely to be less influenced by situational factors (i.e. how 
the child feels on the day and how they perform in a particular social scenario) and can be far 
more easily and objectively scored than behavioural assessments. If it is possible to establish 
‘true’ cognitive subtypes of ASDs then they might well advance the pace of discovery in 
neuroimaging and genetic fields. Another important task that has only just begun to be 
addressed is to distinguish the ASD cognitive phenotype from that of other disorders; 
including those that are common comorbidities such as anxiety and ADHD (Simonoff et al., 
2008; see Yerys et al., 2009). 
Only large studies will possess sufficient power and size to reliably identify subtypes. 
Further, there needs to be a step-up in methods and analysis, for example by the use of test 
and replication samples that are common in the genetics field. With exciting progress being 
made in the fields of genetics and developmental neurobiology, which are changing our view 
of ‘the autisms’, cognitive psychology has to ‘step up to the plate’ and be ambitious in order 
to play its part in illuminating the relations between genes, the brain and behaviour; as well as 
in developing empirically-based approaches to cognitive remediation.  
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Figure 1 Battery of cognitive measures by domain
a
  
Theory of Mind 
1. 1st and 2nd order false belief tasks 
a. Combined 1st + 2nd order story 
b. 1st order story 
c. 2nd order story 
2. ToM failers: Desires story  
3. ToM failers: Unexpected contents 
4. ToM failers: Picture sequencing 
5. ToM passers: Strange stories 
6. ToM passers: Frith-Happé animations 
7. Reading the mind in the eyes task 
8. Penny hiding 
 
Face/Emotion processing 
1. Whole/Part face processing (1 & 2) 
a. Un-prompted 
b. Prompted 
2. Benton facial recognition test 
3. Ekman-Friesen test of affect recognition 
4. Vocal expressions of emotion  
a. Verbal 
b. Non-verbal 
5. Egocentric eye gaze task 
6. Sorting task 
7. Kaufman face recognition test for 
children 
8. Emotion production  
Central coherence 
1. Navon 
a. Divided attention 
b. Selective attention 
2. Sentence completion 
3. Embedded figures 
4. Homographs 
5. Memory for stories (CMS) 
6. Segmented block design 
Executive function 
1. Luria hand game 
2. Trail making test 
3. Planning/drawing 
4. Zoo map test (BADS-C)/Mazes (WISC) 
5. Card sort 
6. Verbal fluency 
7. Design fluency 
8. Opposite worlds (TEA-Ch) 
Perceptual processing 
1. Auditory frequency discrimination 
2. Auditory intensity discrimination 
3. Auditory duration discrimination 
4. Auditory risetime discrimination 
5. Motion coherence 
6. Form from motion 
7. Biological motion 
Memory and attention 
1. 1. Children’s Auditory Verbal Learning 
Test-2 (CAVLT)-2Digit span (CMS) 
2. Picture locations (CMS) 
3. 1st and 2nd name (RBMT) 
4. Belonging (RBMT) 
5. Appointment (RBMT) 
6. Route (RBMT) 
7. Score! (TEA-Ch) 
8. Map mission (TEA-Ch)  
 
a See Appendix 1 for references for all tests 
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Appendix 1: References for tasks used in the SNAP cognitive phenotype study 
 
Theory of Mind 
 
9. 1st and 2nd order false belief tasks 
a. Combined 1st + 2nd order story 
Coull, G.J., Leekam, S,R., Bennett, M. 2006. Simplifying Second-order Belief Attribution: 
What Facilitates Children's Performance on Measures of Conceptual Understanding? Soc 
Devel. 15, 260-275. 
b. 1st order story 
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A.M., Frith, U. 1985. Does the autistic child have a theory of mind? 
Cognition. 21, 37-46. 
a. 2nd order story 
Bowler, D.M. 1992. "Theory of mind" in Asperger's syndrome. J Child Psychol 
Psychiatry. 33, 877-893. 
 
10. ToM failers: Desires story 
Bartsch, K., & Wellman, H. M. (1989). Young children’s attribution of action to belief and 
desires. Child Devt, 60, 946–964. 
 
11. ToM failers: Unexpected contents 
Perner, J., Leekam, S. R., Wimmer, H. 1987. Three-year-olds difficulty with false belief -the 
case for a conceptual deficit. Br J Dev Psychol, 5, 125-137. 
 
12. ToM failers: Picture sequencing 
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, AM., Frith U 1986. Mechanical, behavioural and intentional 
understanding of picture stories in autistic children. Br J Dev Psychol, 4, 113-125. 
 
13. ToM passers: Strange stories 
Happé, F.G. 1994. An advanced test of theory of mind: understanding of story characters' 
thoughts and feelings by able autistic, mentally handicapped, and normal children and adults. 
J Autism Dev Disord. 24, 129-54. 
 
14. ToM passers: Frith-Happé animations 
Abell, F., Happé, F., Frith, U. 2000. Do triangles play tricks? Attribution of mental states to 
animated shapes in normal and abnormal development. Cog Devel.15, 1-16. 
Castelli, F., Happé, F., Frith, U., Frith, C. 2000. Movement and mind: a functional imaging 
study of perception and interpretation of complex intentional movement patterns. 
Neuroimage. 12, 314-325. 
 
15. Reading the mind in the eyes – children’s version 
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J. 2001. The 'Reading the mind in the eyes' test 
revised version: A study with normal adults, and adults with Asperger Syndrome or High-
Functioning autism. J Child Psychol Psychiatry.42, 241-252. 
 
16. Penny hiding 
Baron-Cohen, S. 1992. Out of sight or out of mind? Another look at deception in autism. J 
Child Psychol Psychiatry. 33, 1141-55. 
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Face/Emotion processing 
9. Whole/Part face processing  
a. Un-prompted 
b. Prompted 
Joseph, R.M., Tanaka, J. 2003. Holistic and part-based face recognition in children with 
autism. J Child Psychol Psychiatry. 44, 529-542. 
 
10. Benton facial recognition test 
Benton, A.L., Sivan, A.B., Hamsher, K. deS., Varney, N.R., Spreen, O. 1994. Contributions 
to neuropsychological assessment. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
11. Ekman-Friesen test of affect recognition 
Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V. 1976. Pictures of facial affect. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting 
Psychologists Press. 
 
12. Vocal expressions of emotion 
a. Verbal 
b. Non-verbal 
Sauter, D.A., Eisner, F., Calder, A.J., Scott, S.K. 2010. Perceptual cues in nonverbal vocal 
expressions of emotion. Q J Exp Psychol (Colchester). 28, 1-22. 
 
13. Egocentric eye gaze task 
Elgar, K., Campbell, R., Skuse, D. 2002. Are you looking at me? Accuracy in processing 
line-of-sight in Turner syndrome. Proc Biol Sci. 269, 2415-2422. 
 
14. Sorting task 
Weeks, S.J., Hobson, R.P. 1987. The salience of facial expression for autistic children. J 
Child Psychol Psychiatry. 28, 137-151. 
 
15. Kaufman face recognition test for children 
Kaufman, A.S., Kaufman, N.L. 1983. Kaufman assessment battery for children. Minnesota: 
American Guidance Service.  
 
16. Emotion production 
Volker, M.A., Lopata, C., Smith, D.A., Thomeer, M.L. 2009. Facial encoding of children 
with high-functioning autism spectrum disorders. Focus Autism Other Dev Disabl. 24, 195-
204.   
 
Central coherence 
 
7. Navon 
a. Divided attention 
b. Selective attention 
Plaisted, K., Swettenham, J., Rees, L. 1999. Children with autism show local precedence in a 
divided attention task and global precedence in a selective attention task. J Child Psychol 
Psychiatry. 40, 733-742. 
 
8. Sentence completion 
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Booth, R., Happé, F. 2010. "Hunting with a knife and ... fork": examining central coherence 
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